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LIST OF PARTIES
The parties to the proceeding below are: plaintiffs/appellants Kitches &
Zom, L.L.C and Erika E. Zom and Randy L. Zom dba ERZ Partnership (collectively
"Kitches & Zom, L.L.C."); and defendants Yong Hwan Kim aka Kim Yong Hwan, Sah
Kwi Suk aka Kwi Suk Kim, and Yong Woo Kim. The parties to this appeal are the
collective Kitches & Zom (plaintiffs/appellants) and Yong Woo Kim
(defendant/appellee). The other parties below have no interest in this appeal.
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-2a-3(2)(j).
ISSUES
I.

Did the trial court err in its determination that the plain language of

Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1, et seq. required plaintiff to both file its abstract of judgment
in the Registry of Judgments and record the abstract of judgment at the office of the
county recorder in order to attach its judgment lien to the real property? [Issue preserved
in R. at 54-106, and Tr. of 2/17/04 Hrg. at 1-11]
Standard of Review: The trial court's interpretation of statutes, rules and
ordinances is a question of law reviewed for correctness. See Rushton v. Salt Lake
County, 977 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1999); Taylor ex rel. C.T. v. Johnson. 977 P.2d 479,
480 (Utah 1999).
II.

Did the trial court err in its conclusion that the language of the statue

was unambiguous and err in its decision to not consider evidence submitted regarding the
legislative intent and history of the judgment lien statute? [Issue preserved in R. at 54106, and Tr. of 2/17/04 Hrg. at 1-11]
Standard of Review: A question of legislative intent associated with
statutory interpretation is a matter of law, not of fact. See State v. Mitchell 824 P.2d 469,
471-72 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND
REGULATIONS
Utah Code Ann. §78-22-1
Utah Code Ann. §78-22-1.5
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter arose when plaintiff tried to collect on a judgment obtained in
Third District Court for Salt Lake County by filing a miscellaneous action in Davis
County to execute on real property owned by defendant. Although plaintiff complied
with the statutory requirements set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1(7) to create a lien
on real property, the trial court determined Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1.5 required plaintiff
to comply with a two-step process. Accordingly, the trial court determined plaintiffs lien
was not properly perfected and granted defendant's motion to quash the Writ of
Execution. Plaintiff appeals from the trial court's grant of defendant's motion to quash.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff sued defendant Yong Woo Kim in the Third District Court in and
for Salt Lake County. Judge Timothy Hansen entered judgement on March 17, 2003 in
favor of plaintiff and against defendant in the amount of approximately $38,000.00 with
interest accruing and with a provision allowing augmentation of the judgement by
reasonable attorneys fees and costs incurred in effecting collection. (R. at 1-2) Plaintiff
became aware that Yong Woo Kim was the sole owner of real property in Davis County,
2

and on May 9, 2003, it recorded an abstract of judgement with the Davis County Recorder
in order to establish a lien on the real property. (R. at 1-2, 32-41)
After the abstract of judgement was recorded with the Davis County
Recorder on May 9, 2003, defendant Yong Woo Kim deeded the real property at issue to
his wife, Hye Ok Kim without consideration on May 12, 2003. (R. at 117-118; Tran. of
2/17/04 hearging at p. 8) That deed was subsequently recorded. Plaintiff filed a
miscellaneous action in the Second Judicial District Court for Davis County for the
purpose of obtaining judicial assistance with enforcement of the Third District Court
Judgement through Sheriffs Sale. (R. at 1-25)
On November 25, 2003, plaintiff obtained a Writ of Execution from the
Second District Court for the sale of defendant Kim's Davis County property which was
located at 1106 East 400 North, Bountiful, Utah. (R. at 26-29) Defendant Kim objected
to the Writ of Execution arguing that under Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1.5(2) plaintiff was
required to not only record the Third District Court Judgement with the Davis County
Recorder but to also file the Judgement in the Registry of Judgements at the Davis County
District Court Clerk's office. (R. at 42-44; 108-116)
In response to defendant Kim's objection, plaintiff submitted Affidavits
from the sponsor of the 2001 amendments to the Judgement Act, from the Davis County
Attorney regarding his interpretation of the proper application of amended statute by the
3

Davis County Recorder, and by the Second District Court Clerk regarding the practices of
the District Court, all to show that the additional filing argued by defendant Kim was not
necessary or intended under the statute as amended in 2001. (R. at 49-51; 52-53; 54-105)
A hearing on the matter was held by Judge Rodney S. Page on February 17,
2004. On March 2, 2004, Judge Page entered an Order quashing the execution on the real
property for the reasons argued by defendant Kim. (R. at 117-118; 119-121) Specifically,
the trial court determined the statutory language was unambiguous in creating a two-step
process for attaching a lien to real property and declined to consider the affidavits
submitted by plaintiff. (Tr. at 5-8,10)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court properly interpreted the
judgment lien statute found at Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1, et seq. It is undisputed that
plaintiff recorded a proper abstract of judgment in the office of the Davis County
Recorder on May 9, 2003.
Notwithstanding defendant's arguments and the trial court's determination,
the statutory language unambiguously requires a party to only record an abstract of
judgment in order to attach a lien to real property. The trial court's interpretation of the
statute creates conflicts between provisions, is at odds with the statute's language and
does not follow the legislative intent. The Legislature intended to streamline the process
4

for creating liens and create one repository for all information affecting title to real
property. Nothing in the statute or legislative history indicate uu * d* -^aure was trying
<o iieatr a inoi'' i iiNibeisome process far rivaling :md s^an, hirijj, fo" Unv> on

IP.I'I

piropnii.

Accordingly, the trial court erred when it determined the 2001 statutory amendments
created a more cumbersome two-step process for creating liens.
ARGUMEN I
I.

The Statute Unambiguously Requires Recording A Judgment In the
County Recorder's Office in Order to Create 4 I ,ien On Real Property.
1 'he trial court erred when it interpreted the unambiguous language of tl ic
'-

r

* ah'meats and a recording in the office

of the county recorder. Plaintiff ha-. a \ a h d lien auamsi the defendant's real property
located in Davis County, I u

s^.'cui-.* <; recorded .;u ai.*aa* • . -.; igmen; . = . ivv

a is

defendant's Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution on the grounds that plaintiff had not
created an enforceable interest prior to defendant conveying his interest in the siibject
property.
Two provisions govern the procedure for filing a lien against real property.
First, Utah Code Ann. § 78-22 1 pro\ "ides:
( 7)(a) After July 1, 2002, a judgment ei itered by a district
court or a justice court in the state becomes a lien upon real
property if:
5

(i) the judgment or an abstract of the judgment
containing the information identifying the judgment debtor as
described in Subsection 78-22-1.5(4) is recorded in the office
of the county recorder; or
(ii) the judgment or an abstract of judgment and a
separate information statement of the judgment creditor as
described in Subsection 78-22-1.5(5) is recorded in the office
of the county recorder.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-l(7)(a) (2003). As will be discussed below in more detail, this
section has historically governed the process for attaching a lien to real property.
According to the plain language of this statute, plaintiff created an enforceable lien by
recording the abstract of judgment with the David County Recorder.
When the Registry of Judgments was created, the Legislature enacted Utah
Code Ann. § 78-22-1.5 provides, in its current version:
(2) On or after July 1, 1997, a judgment entered in a district court does not
create a lien upon or affect the title to real property unless the judgment is
filed in the Registry of Judgments of the office of the clerk of the district
court of the county in which the property is located.
(3) (a) On or after July 1, 2002, except as provided in Subsection (3)(b), a
judgment entered in a district court does not create a lien upon or affect
the title to real property unless the judgment or an abstract of judgment
is recorded in the office of the county recorder in which the real property
of the judgment debtor is located.
(b) State agencies are exempt from the recording requirement of
Subsection (3)(a).
(4) In addition to the requirements of Subsections (2) and (3)(a), any judgment
that is filed in the Registry of Judgments on or after September 1, 1998, or
any judgment or abstract of judgment that is recorded in the office of a
county recorder after July 1, 2002, shall include . . . .
6

Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1 ^ -? K * 3) & (4) (2001).
The sole que^in *n on appeal is w liethei the trial court errcu m irdete rmii mtioi i that this above i eferenced stati ites reqi lire a pai t) to file ai i absti act :>f
judgment both in the Registry of Judgments and the office of the county recorder

r

whether the statutes only requires a party attempting to lien real property a \ u
2002 to file in tl le office of the coi ii it) i ecoi der.
"When construing a statute, we must give effect to legislative intern "
Versluis v. Guaranty National Companies, 842 P.2d 865, 8(>7
Jordan v. Morrisoi

-Mi'
?.--•.

^j. * (citing West
"

statute's plain language and only if some ambiguity exists does a court need to look
further. See Schurtz v. BMW of North America. Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1112-1115 (IJtah

give effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning." Versluis, 842
P.2dat867.
In this case, tl le :p lestioi t is i .,/ hat pi o\ isions in / '8 22 1 ait id 7 78- 22 1 5
apply to the creation of a lien after July 1, 2002. The trial court did not address 78-22-1
and determined subsections (2) and (3) operated together rather than independently, and
tl n is, tl ic statute i equii edbc ill i filii lgs Ii i Scl mi tz v. BM VV of North America, Inc the
Utah Supreme Court was faced with a similar statutory interpretation, namely whether
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statutory provision operated independently or dependency. See Schurtz v. BMW of
North America. Inc.. 814 P.2d 1108. 1112-1115 (Utah 1991).
The first thing the court looked at was the language of the statute in light of
the context of the overall statute. See id. at 1112. In this matter, Chapter 22 is
appropriately titled "Judgments." See Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1. Within Chapter 22,
section 1 deals with the following topics: "Duration of judgment - Judgment as a lien
upon real property - Abstract of judgment - Small claims judgment not a lien - Appeal
of judgment - Child support orders." Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1 (emphasis added).
Section 1.1 addresses judgment against a party who dies after a verdict is rendered and is
not applicable to this issue. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1.1. Next, section 1.5 is
entitled: "Definitions - Judgment recorded in Registry of Judgments." Utah Code Ann. §
78-22-1.5. The remaining sections of Chapter 22 have no bearing on the issues in this
appeal. Given this context, Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1 rather than 78-22-1.5 was intended
to cover the creation of a judgment lien against real property.
Historically, section 1.5 is new relative to section 1. Prior to 1997, all
judgments entered in district court immediately became liens on all of the debtor's
property in the county where the judgment was entered. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1
and historical notes. In 1997, the Utah Legislature approved Senate Bill 121 which
created the Registry of Judgments. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1.5 and historical notes,
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see also Utah Legislature Rep't 1997 Vol. 2, p. 906. With the creation of the Registry of
Judgments, a judgment entered in district court did not become a lien on real property
•

V.

:

' ^

-"

1 6C-L.5.

When it was first enacted, section 1.5 contained only two paragraphs:
subsection (1) defined the Registry of Judgment, and subsection (2) stated:; "On oi after

upon or affect the title of real property unless the judgment is recorded in the
Judgments of the office of the clerk of the district court of the county ; .•

RCLH^P

. -r

the

proper!:) is 1< H::::J i/l .< : i 1 " " I Ill i it i O n 1< )i Vt :n i § ; 8 2 2 1 5 ( 1 9 9 / ) IE h u t:I i<

•

'•

1 was

modified in 1997 to indicate that only judgments filed prior to J u v ., iJ91 created liens
on real property. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1 (1997) In creating the Registry of
Judgments and enacting section 1

1 •.

IM1|HHI.HII IN II.

I- llul IL I1'** ' u

IMOII

rf

section 1 contained no reference to the Registry r^ f Mdements and did not set forth the
procedure for creating a lien on real property after July - < oo*7. See T Ttah Code Ann. §
/8»22» i (I *)() /1 Accordingly, between 199 7 and 2002,

i i|:i,i i l l "' 'i

M

it;

'% mi

sf

78 22 1 5

governed the process for attaching a lien against real property and required only a filing
the judgment in the Registry of Judgments.
In 2001, the I legislature passed House Bill 305, \:v hicli modified both
sec tioii 1 and sectioi I 1 5 (II at 88-96) Specifically, section 1 5 v 'as amended to include
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subsection (3) which changed the requirement for attaching a lien to real property.
Additionally, section 1 was modified to include subsection (7) which set forth
requirements for filing a lien against real property. As amended and in their current
versions, both subsection (3) to section 1.5 and subsection (7) to section 1 provide the
same procedure for attaching a judgment lien to real property after July 1, 2002: A
judgment becomes a lien on real property if it is recorded in the office of the county
recorder. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-22-1(7) & -1.5(3). The 2001 modifications to
section 1 still do not contain any reference to the Registry of Judgments, nor is there any
reference to any provision which would require filing the judgment in the Registry of
Judgment in order to lien real property. Both statutes only require recording in the office
of the county recorder in order to create a judgment lien on real property.
Examining the plain language of the statutory provisions in the context of
the related statutes and history of the amendments, the Utah Legislature intended to
change the requirements for creating a lien on real property. Prior to 1997, a lien was
created automatically upon entry of a judgment in district court. Between 1997 and 2002,
a lien was created only if the judgement was filed in the Registry of Judgments. After
2002, a lien is created only by recording the judgment in the office of the county recorder.
The plain language and history of the statute indicate subsections (2) and (3) of section
1.5 are meant to be read independently of one another. The Legislature did not include
10

any language to indicate recording the judgment was an extra requirement in addition to
filing the judgment.
When interpreting the plain language of the statute, the court must look at
the language in the context of the related statutory provisions. See Schurtz, 814 P.2d at
1112. Furthermore, the court must "construe statutory provisions so as to give full effect
to all their terms, where possible." IdL Construing the statutes as dependent on one
another, as the district court did, would create conflict between statutory provisions and
force strained readings of other provisions. The only way to harmonize the requirements
in section 1 with section 1.5 is to read subsections (2) and (3) of section 1.5
independently. To read them as dependent and creating a two-step process is at odds with
subsection (7) of section 1. Specifically, subsection (7) of section 1 sets forth the
requirements for creating a lien on real property. The only requirement in subsection (7)
is to record the judgment in office of the county recorder in accordance with the notice
and content provisions of subsections (4) or (5) of section 1.5. Because subsection (7)
sets forth the requirements for creating a lien and does not require filing the judgment in
the Registry of Judgments, the trial court's interpretation creates a conflict between
sections 1 and 1.5. For this reason, subsections (2) and (3) of section 1.5 should be read
to operate independently of one another in order to avoid this conflict.
Subsection (4) in section 1.5 also indicates the provisions are to operate
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independently. Subsection (4) states: "In addition to the requirements of Subsections (2)
and (3)(a), any judgment that is filed in the Registry of Judgments on or after September
1, 1998, or any judgment or abstract of judgment that is recorded in the office of a county
recorder after July 1, 2002, shall include . . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1.5(4) (2001)
(emphasis added). If both filing and recording were required, the Legislature would have
used the word "and11 rather than "or." The word "or" indicates that the Legislature was
intended to require filing in one place or the other, not both.
Because a statute should be construed according to its plain language, to
give proper meaning to each term and to harmonize all provisions, the district court erred
when it concluded Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1.5 required plaintiff to file the abstract of
judgment both in the Registry of Judgments and to record the abstract of judgment at the
office of the county recorder. Plaintiff had a valid lien as of May 9, 2003 when it
recorded the abstract of judgment in the Davis County Recorder's Office. Accordingly,
the trial court erred in granting defendant's Motion to Quash.
II.

The Legislative History Supports Plaintiffs Interpretation of the
Judgment Lien Statute.
In addition to the plain language of the statute, the Legislative history of the

2001 amendments also indicates that subsections (2) and (3) should be read
independently. "For assistance in ascertaining the meaning of statutory language, we look
to the background and general purpose of the statute." Versluis v. Guaranty National
12

Companies. 842 P.2d 865, 867 (Utah 1992) (citing Jamison v Utah Home Fire Ins. Co.,
559 P.2d 958, 959 (Utah 1977)). Specifically, the history of the statute indicates an
attempt to create one central repository for judgment liens on real property. Those
performing title searches needed a more expedient system to verify clean titles. Because
a title search must include a search at the county recorder's office, it makes sense to
require a judgment lien to be recorded at the recorder's office.
The trial court's interpretation of the statute does not make sense in light of
the objectives of the statute. The statute is in place to ensure notice to the debtor and
notice to anyone else interested in the title of subject property. The obvious place to
check is at the recorder's office. Nevertheless, defendant and the trial court would place
one more hoop into the process. This hoop would serve no purpose, as all the necessary
searches on property can be done at the recorder's office. Accordingly, interpreting the
statute to require a two-step process does nothing more than create another technicality
for anyone trying to recover a judgment. In this respect, it is important to note that those
performing title searches and those trying to enforce valid judgments are often not
attorneys. Nevertheless, to read the statutory provisions in 78-22-1.5 as dependent, would
require lawyers and non-lawyers alike to reconcile the conflicting provisions of 78-221(7) with 78-22-1.5(2) & (3). In amending the statute in 2002, it is hard to imagine the
Legislature making amendments which add procedural technicalities and inconsistencies

13

into the statute,.
The Legislative history shows that the legislature intended to shift judgment
filings from the office of the court clerk to the recorder. This modification was needed to
assist title companies searching the records for judgment liens. (R. at 49-50) Previously,
researchers would visit the clerk's office to locate liens, but with the advent of electronic
filing, multiple court sites, expansion of the court system and the archaic archive system
still employed in many rural areas, researchers found it difficult if not impossible to locate
judgment liens. To rectify this problem, the bill, codified in the above statute, provided
that a judgment or abstract of judgment constituted a lien when it was recorded in the
office of the county recorder. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1 & -1.5. (R. at 49-50)
Also, fiscal notes issued during the bill's consideration demonstrate the
Legislature's intention to assist title researchers and to transition filings from the office of
the court clerk to the office of the recorder. "If abstracts are no longer filed with the
Courts due to passage of this bill there could be a potential loss of General Fund
revenue." (R. at 98-99) "Passage of this bill would result in cost savings to title
companies resulting from the time savings on research related to liens on property." (R.
at 98-99) There is no indication from any of these sources that the Legislature intended
to create a requirement of filing in the Registry of Judgments in addition to recording
with the county recorder. Such a rule would increase the cost of researching title and
14

make it more cumbersome.
Finally, interviews of the clerks of the court reveal that the clerks do not
advise the public to file in both places, and they only recognize liens against real property
if the judgment or abstract has been filed with the county recorder. (R. at 101-02)
Likewise, the county recorder confirms that judgments need to be filed solely in his office
to be a valid lien against real property. (R. at 101-02) Further, the Davis County attorney
acknowledges that the "process used in Davis County for recording and establishing
judgment liens requires only the filing of a judgment or abstract of judgment with the
county recorder and does not require any filing with the clerk of the court." (R. at 10405)
In short, the Legislature intended to simplify and centralize the process for
filing and locating liens. The 2001 amendments to the statute were not an attempt to
make it more cumbersome to create and search for liens. Accordingly, both Utah Code
Ann. §§ 78-22-1 & -1.5 were amended to reflect the legislative intent to streamline the
process by requiring all real property liens to be recorded in the office of the county
recorder. Upon recording the required information, the statute unambiguously provides in
two separate provisions that a lien attaches to real property without any further filings.
The trial court's ruling which creates a more cumbersome process is at odds with the
language and intent and was in error.
15

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing facts and authorities, plaintiff/appellant requests this
court to reverse the trial court's interpretation of the judgment lien statute and reverse its
grant of defendant's motion to quash.
DATED this

3

day of SepkuXeJ^OO^
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON

OBERT L. STEVENS
ACHARY E. PETERSON
'Attorneys for Appellants
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c
UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART III. Procedure
CHAPTER 22. JUDGMENT
78-22-1 Duration of judgment — J u d g m e n t as a lien upon real property
—
Abstract of judgment — S m a l l claims judgment not a lien — A p p e a l of judgment
— Child support orders.

(1) Judgments shall continue for eight years from the date of entry in a court
unless previously satisfied or unless enforcement of the judgment is stayed in
accordance with law.

(2) Prior to July 1, 1997, except as limited by Subsections (4) and (5), the entry
of judgment by a district court creates a lien upon the real property of the
judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, owned or acquired during the existence
of the judgment, located in the county in which the judgment is entered.

(3) An abstract of judgment issued by the court in which the judgment is entered
may be filed in any court of this state and shall have the same force and effect
as a judgment entered in that court.

(4) Prior to July 1, 1997, and after May 15, 1998, a judgment entered in the small
claims division of any court shall not qualify as a lien upon real property unless
abstracted to the civil division of the district court and recorded in accordance
with Subsection (3).

(5) (a) If any judgment is appealed, upon deposit, with the court where the
notice of appeal is filed, of cash or other security in a form and amount
considered sufficient by the court that rendered the judgment to secure the
full amount of the judgment, together with ongoing interest and any other
anticipated damages or costs, including attorney's fees and costs
on appeal,
the lien created by the judgment shall be terminated as provided in Subsection
(5) (b) .

(b) Upon the deposit of sufficient security as provided in Subsection (5) (a) ,
the court shall enter an order terminating the lien created by the judgment
and granting the judgment creditor a perfected lien in the deposited security
as of the date of the original judgment.

Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

rage j ui 10

UT ST § 78-22-1
U.C.A. 1953 § 78-22-1

Page 2

(6) (a) A child support order or a sum certain judgment for past due support
may be enforced:

d ) within four years after the date the youngest child reaches majority;
or

(n) eight years from
entered by a tribunal.

the

date

of

entry

of

the

sum

certain

judgment

(b) The longer period of duration shall apply in every order.

(c) A sum certain judgment may be renewed to extend the duration.

(7) (a) After July 1, 2002, a judgment entered by a district
justice court in the state becomes a lien upon real property if:

court

or a

(I) the judgment or an abstract of the judgment containing the information
identifying the judgment debtor as described in Subsection 78-22-1.5(4) is
recorded in the office of the county recorder; or

(n) the judgment or an abstract of the judgment and a separate
information statement of the judgment creditor as described in Subsection
78-22-L.5(5) is recorded in the office of the county recorder.

(b) The judgment shall run from the date of entry by the district court or
justice court.

(c) The real property subject to the lien includes all the real property of
the judgment debtor:

(I) in the county
(n) occurs; and

in which

the recording

under

Subsection

(7) (a) (I)

or

(n) owned or acquired at any time by the judgment debtor during the time
the judgment is effective.

(d) State agencies
(7) (a) .

are exempt

from the

recording

requirement

of

Subsection

Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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(8) (a) A judgment referred to in Subsection (7) shall be entered under the
name of the judgment debtor in the judgment index in the office of the county
recorder as required in Section 17-21-6.

(b) A judgment containing a legal description shall also be abstracted in the
appropriate tract index in the office of the county recorder.

History: C. 1953, 78-22-1, enacted by L. 1992, ch. 127, § 15; 1997, ch. 96, § 1;
1998, ch. 327, § 2; 1999, ch. 75, § 1; 2000, ch. 161, § 20; 2001, ch. 370, § 6;
2003, ch. 176, § 13.

NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS

Repeals and Reenactments. --Laws 1992, ch. 127, § 15 repeals former § 78-22-1, as
last amended by L. 1977, ch. 77, § 69, relating to a lien of judgment, and enacts
the present section, effective April 27, 1992.

Amendment Notes. — T h e
1998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998, substituted
"recorded" for "filed and docketed" in Subsection (3); and in Subsection (4) added
"and after May 15, 1998" near the beginning, substituted "abstracted to the civil
division of the district court and recorded" for "filed and docketed," and deleted
the last sentence which read "This Subsection (4) shall apply to all small claims
judgments entered on or after April 27, 1992."
The 1999 amendment, effective March 17, 1999, substituted "Subsections
(5)" for "Subsection (4)" in Subsection (2) and added Subsection (5).

(4) and

The 2000 amendment, effective May 1, 2000, added "Except as provided in Subsection
(6)" in Subsection (1) and added Subsection (6).
The 2001 amendment, effective July 1, 2002, inserted "from the date of entry in a
court" m Subsection (1), added Subsections (7) and (8), and made stylistic
changes.
The 2003 amendment, effective May 5, 2003, deleted "Except as provided in
Subsection (6)" at the beginning of Subsection (1), substituted "or a sum certain
judgment for past due support may be enforced" for "may be pursued at any time" in
Subsection (6) (a), added Subsections (6)(a)(n), (6)(b), and (6)(c), and made
stylistic changes.

Cross-References. —Execution, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 69.
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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UTAH CODE, 195 3
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART III. Procedure
CHAPTER 22. JUDGMENT
78-22-1.5 Definitions

-Judgment recorded in Registry of Judgments.

(1) For purposes of this section, "Registry of Judgments" means the index where a
judgment shall be filed and searchable by the name of the judgment debtor through
electronic means or by tangible document.

(2) On or after July 1, 1997, a judgment entered in a district court does not
create a lien upon or affect the title to real property unless the judgment is
filed in the Registry of Judgments of the office of the clerk of the district
court of the county in which the property is located.

(3) (a) On or after July 1, 2002, except as provided in Subsection (3) (b) , a
judgment entered in a district court does not create a lien upon or affect the
title to real property unless the judgment or an abstract of judgment is
recorded in the office of the county recorder in which the real property of
the judgment debtor is located.

(b) State agencies
(3) (a) .

are exempt

from the

recording

requirement

of

Subsection

(4) In addition to the requirements of Subsections (2) and (3) (a) , any judgment
that is filed in the Registry of Judgments on or after September 1, 1998, or any
judgment or abstract of judgment that is recorded in the office of a county
recorder after July 1, 2002, shall include:

(a) the information identifying
abstract of judgment; or

the

judgment

debtor

on

the

judgment

or

(b) a copy of the separate information statement of the judgment creditor that
contains:

(I) the correct name and last-known address of each judgment debtor and
the address at which each judgment debtor received service of process;
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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(n) the name and address of the judgment creditor;

( m ) the amount of the judgment as filed in the Registry of Judgments;

(iv) if known, the judgment debtor's social security number,
birth, and driver's license number if a natural person; and

date

of

(v) whether or not a stay of enforcement has been ordered by the court and
the date the stay expires.

(5) For the information required in Subsection (4), the judgment creditor shall:

(a) provide the information on the separate information statement if known or
available to the judgment creditor from its records, its attorney's records,
or the court records in the action in which the judgement was entered; or

(b) state on the separate
unknown or unavailable.

information

statement

that

the

information

is

(6) (a) Any judgment that requires payment of money and is entered in a
district court on or after September 1, 1998, or any judgment or abstract of
judgment recorded in the office of a county recorder after July 1, 2002, that
does not include the debtor identifying information as required in Subsection
(4) is not a lien until a separate information statement of the judgment
creditor is recorded in the office of a county recorder in compliance with
Subsections (4) and (5).

(b) The separate information statement of the judgment creditor referred to
Subsection (6)(a) shall include:

m

(I) the name of any judgment creditor, debtor, assignor, or assignee;

(n) the date of recording; and

( m ) the entry number of the original judgment or abstract of judgment.

(7) A judgment that requires payment of money recorded on or after September 1,
1998, but prior to July 1, 2002, has as its priority the date of entry, except as
to parties with actual or constructive knowledge of the judgment.
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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(8) A judgment or notice of judgment wrongfully
subject to Title 38, Chapter 9, Wrongful Liens.

filed against

real property is

History: C. 1953, 78-22-1.5, enacted by L. 1997, ch. 96, § 2; 1998, ch. 327, § 3;
2001, ch. 306, § 1; 2001, ch. 370, § 7.

NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS

Amendment Notes. — T h e
(3) to (6) .

1998 amendment, effective May

4, 1998, added

Subsections

The 2001 amendment by ch. 306, effective April 30, 2001, added the exception at
the end of Subsection (6) and added Subsection (7).
The 2001 amendment by ch. 370, effective July 1, 2002, rewrote the section to
require recording the judgment or abstract of judgment with the county recorder
and to further specify the requirements for the separate information statement.
This section has been reconciled by the Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.

U.C.A. 1953 § 78-22-1.5, UT ST § 78-22-1.5

Statutes current through the 2004 Third Special Session. Annotations current
through 2004 UT 27 (4/1/2004); 2004 UT APP 102 (4/1/2004) and April 1, 2004
(Federal Cases).

Copyright © 2004 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the

of the LexisNexis Group.

All rights reserved.
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MAR 0 2 2004
SECOND
DISTRICT COURT
SUSAN C.NOYCE (#6119)
j. G A R R Y MCALLISTER (#2139)
1807 East Maple Hills Drive
Bountiful, UT 84010
Telephone: (801)299-8678
Fax: (801)299-8678
Attorneys for Defendant YONG WOO KIM

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KITCHES & ZORN, L.L.C. a Utah limited
liability company, and ERIKA E. ZORN and
RANDY L. ZORN dba ERZ PARTNERSHIP
Plaintiffs,
vs.

:
:
:

YONG HWAN KIM aka KIM YONG HWAN,
SAK KWI SUK aka KWISUK KIM and
YONG WOO KIM,

ORDER QUASHING PLAINTIFF'S
WRIT OF EXECUTION

Civil No. 036702072
Judge Rodney S. Page

:

Defendants.

Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Writ of Execution came on for hearing on Tuesday,
February 17. 2004 before the Honorable Rodney S. Page. Counsel of record Russell C. Ferricks
and Ramona E. Garcia of Richards, Brandt, Miller and Nelson were present and represented
plaintiff. Counsel of record Susan C. Noyce was present and represented defendant, Yong Woo
Kim.
The parties having previously briefed the Court in the matter presented their arguments.
The Court after being fully advised enters the following:

Order Quashing Plaintiffs Writ of Execution

mf?702072

VD11510492
KIM.YONG HWAN

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.. On March 17, 2003, judgment on behalf of plaintiff against defendant, Yong Woo
Kim, was entered in Third District Court in Salt Lake City, Utah.
2. On May 9,2003, plaintiff recorded the judgment against defendant in the office of the
Davis County Recorder.
3. On May 12, 2003, Yong Woo Kim executed a Quit Claim Deed quitclaiming his
interest in real property located at 1106 East 400 North, Bountiful, Utah to his wife,
Hye Ok Kim. The deed was recorded on May 19, 2003 and then recorded again on
June 13. 2003.
4. On July 29, 2003, plaintiff filed an abstract of the judgment obtained in Third District
Court along with the debtor information sheet with the clerk of the Second District
Court in Davis County.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Section 78-22-1.5 of the Utah Code Ann. requires a two-step process in order to
create a lien on real property. The judgment must be recorded in the office of the
County Recorder in the county in which the property is located and filed in the
Registry of Judgments in the office of the clerk of the district court of the county in
which the property is located.
2. A judgment lien upon a debtor's real property is not perfected until both steps of 7822-1.5 U.C.A. are taken.
3. The requirements and language of 78-22-1.5 U.C.A. are not ambiguous.
4. Plaintiffs judgment lien did not attach to the property quitclaimed to Mrs. Kim
because plaintiff did not complete the second step required by 78-22-1.5 U.C.A. until
Julv 29. 2003.

5. Plaintiff has no perfected nor enforceable judgment lien on the property located at
1106 East 400 North Bountiful, Utah.
ORDER
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that defendant's motion to quash the plaintiffs Writ of Execution is granted.
DATED this £^_ day of rM(Uck

, 2004.
BY THE COURT:

1 ST/Tp \%t

Approved as to form:

District Court f$k
| *£ \
*,c£\

~ C]C
. t2.!
UiAH

\ ^
/Oj
/coj

v^- w

By
Counsel for Plaintiff

'V^w*"^

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed ORDER
QUASHING PLAINTIFF'S WRIT OF EXECUTION, was mailed, via U.S. Mail, postage
prepaid, this 18th day of February, 2004, to the plaintiffs attorneys at the following address:
Russell C. Ferricks
Ramona E. Garcia
RICHARDS, BRANDT. MILLER & NELSON
50 South Main Street. 7th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2465
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2nd District - Farmington^COURT
DAVIS * COUNTY A STAlfe OF^ UTAH!
KITCHES & ZORlf* LLC - Et al,
Plaintiff,

MINUTE?
OBJECTION HEARING

vs.

Case: NoT036702072 A»I

YONG HWAN KIM Et al,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date?

Clerk:

RODNEY Sf PAGE .
February^i7, 2004

tacyb

PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s) :• RUSSELU C.FERICKS
. RAMONA E;GARCIA
Defendant's Attorney(s): SUSAN'C NOYCES
Video
Tape Numberr
2/17/04 Tape Count*: 10:31

HEARING^
TAPE: 2/17/04
COUNT: 10:31
This is the Jtime set*for hearing on defendant's objection to
plaintiff's Writ of Execution,
Ms. Noyce presents argument*
Ms. Garcia presents argument.
COUNT; 101:41
The Courto/rules as follows: The Court is aware of^ther^ evolution:*•
of the iawiiregarding* liens. Statute 78-22-1 is* referenced! In ttii
past, a lien was* automatically attached when a judgment entered.
Now, the mere entry of jugment does not constitute a lien on real
property unless other steps are taken.
After July 1, 1997, a lien was not created unless it was filed in
the Registry of Judgments in the District Court in the county in
which the property is located.
After July 1, 2002, (except regarding Subsection 3B)^ the law, was
revised so that a judgment does not become-a lien unless^ it was^^
also filed with the County Recorder" in'the county in which, the^ real
property is located.
Page 1
2

JnA

Case No: 036702072
Date^^ft Fefc*Tl7^ 2004

rt? Kim^pHBi

[ i l i n g s i and£ theCquitclain
[attached.to'thejproperty4
,JThe Motion^to£ Quash

granted.
This^ralihg^does not, precludefc>th^pla£ntif f_fronf pursuing a claim
of frai^duient/conveyance^
Mr: FerickslRepresentsCthar^thafircIaiWhas b e e n ; f i l e d .
Ms. Noyce^is^to prepare the < order frora^ today's hearing and submit
i t t o "opposing- counsel- at: l e a s t ' f i v e days prior to i t s submission?
to the Court for signature.
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT

KITCHES & ZORN, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v
YONGHWANKIM,
Defendant.
OBJECTION HEARING FEBRUARY 17, 2004
BEFORE
THE HONORABLE RODNEY S. PAGE

CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER
1775 E. Ellen Way
Sandy, Utah 84092
801-523-1186

popy

APPEARANCES

i
s

)

For the Plaintiff:

RUSSELL C. FERICKS
RAMONA E. GARCIA
RICHARDS, BRANDT,
MILLER & NELSON

j
|
|
j

For the Defendant:

SUSAN C.NOYCE
ATTORNEY AT LAW
* * *

|

1 !

FARMINGTON, UTAH; TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 2004

2 J

HONORABLE RODNEY S. PAGE, JUDGE PRESIDING

3

P R O C E E D I N G S

4
5

THE COURT:

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

This

is the time set for argument in the matter of Kitches & Zorn

6 j vs. Kim.

This is in regards to an execution which was filed

7 I and objection filed thereto by the defendants.
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Counsel, will you state your names for the record
please?
MR. FERICKS:

Your Honor, Russell Fericks and Ramona

Garcia on behalf of the plaintiff, Kitches & Zorn.
MS. NOYCE:

Susan Noyce, Your Honor, on behalf of

defendant Yong Hwan Kim.
THE COURT:

Ms. Noyce, this started out as your

motion, so you may speak to it if you'd like to.

16

MS. NOYCE:

Thank you, Your Honor.

17 j

Your Honor, whereas both sides have briefed the court

18

on this matter, I won't recite the facts or any of that.

19

position is the same that it has always been.

20

78-22-1.5 requires that in order to have a judgment lien

Our

The statute,

21 i against real property there are two requirements: recording in j
22

the office of the county recorder's office and docketing in the |

23 | district court.

We believe that both requirements are

24 I necessary and that without both of them for any judgment

i
25

entered after July 19, 1997 and a judgment entered after July

1 j 2002 you cannot have a valid lien against real property.

We

I
2 j believe that this statute goes hand in hand with Rule 69
3 j regarding writs of execution.

In order to obtain a writ of

4 I execution, you must present to the court clerk evidence of
5 I having docketed the judgment.
6

I

Without docketing the judgment, j

they will not issue a writ of execution.

Plaintiff has argued

7 j that you only need one - one requirement under that statute and
8

that it is recording with the county recorder's office.

9 j However, if that were true they would not have been able to get
10 I the writ of execution.
11

They complied with both steps.

They

complied with the first step, recording, in May of 2003.

They

12 j complied with the second step in July - at the end of July.
13

By

that time the defendant had no interest in real property.

14

We believe that just logically if we are to take

15

plaintiff's position that you only need one requirement, that

16

of recording in the office of the county recorder's office in

17

order to obtain a judgment lien, you would essentially have a

18

judgment lien that you couldn't do anything with.

19

no good for you.

20

a logical position.

You couldn't execute upon it.

It would be
It's just not

We believe that the rule is clear, it

21 j requires both; recording in the county recorder, docketing in
22 j the clerk's office, and that until you have both you have no
23
valid lien. And if you have no valid lien, you cannot execute
24

upon it.

25

its writ of execution, there was nothing for it to execute

And we believe that plaintiff at the time it filed

2

upon.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Who would like to speak for the defense in this
matter?

Ms. Garcia.
MS. GARCIA:

Your Honor, the cardinal rule of

statutory interpretation is determining the intent of the
legislature.

The Supreme Court has told us over and over again

that the best way of determining the intent of the legislature
is to look at the plain language of the statute.

Paragraph

three in 78-22-1.5 states that after July of 2002 to obtain a
lien a judgment needs to be filed in the county recorder's
office.

It does not state that it needs to be filed in the

county recorder's office and with the clerk of the court.

It

does not join paragraph two and three by an and or in addition
to, it simply states that after 2002 filing in the county
recorder's office is the way to obtain a lien.

We filed our

judgment in 2003 which is after 2002, so we complied with the
statutory requirements.
In the defendant's memo she stated that paragraph
four shows that compliance requires dual recordation because it
says subsection two and subsection 3A, but if you read further
in paragraph four, it also states that any judgment that is
filed in the registry of judgments on or after September 1,
1998 or any judgment or abstract of judgment that is recorded
in the office of the county recorder after July of 2002 shall

include certain information about the debtor.
And it is our position that the language of the
statute clearly indicates that after 2002 filing in the
recorder's office is the full requirement for obtaining a
judgment lien.

The writ of execution that the defendant

referred to, the writ does not create the lien.

We need to

file in the court in order to execute on the lien, but the
issue is whether or not we had a valid lien at the time that we
recorded with the county recorder, and according to the
statute, we did have a valid lien.

We're asking the court for

a reasonable interpretation of the statute.
Now, the legislature part of their job is to
harmonize the various books, code sections.

The legislature

would not make it more difficult for any party to obtain a
lien.

If you look at 78-22-1.5 and 78-22-1, to harmonize those

two sections requires that recording with the county recorder
is the only place that a creditor need file a judgment in order
to obtain a lien.

Specifically in 78-22-1 paragraph two

specifies that prior to July of 1997 that a lien should be
filed with the district court.

Paragraph seven of that same

code section specifies after July 2002 a judgment entered by a
district court or a justice court becomes a lien upon real
property if the judgment or abstract of judgment is recorded in
the office of the county recorder.
If any of this seems ambiguous, Your Honor, then I
4

1 j direct your attention to the affidavits of the county recorder
2 i and of Senator Hatch who sponsored the amendments to the
3

judgment lien statute, wherein they both say that the purpose

4 , of the statute is to require filing in one location only.
5

THE COURT:

Thank you.

6

Response, Ms. Noyce.

7

MS. NOYCE:

Your Honor, our argument remains the

8

same.

Had the legislature truly wanted to require only

9

recording in the office of the county recorder after July 2002,

10

it would have been a simple matter to amend paragraph two to

11

say on or after July 1, 1997 and prior to July 1, 2002 that it

12

would then limit that time period.

13

that given the impact on the general revenue fund that I

14

believe was cited to by plaintiffs, that regardless of what

15

Senator Hatch envisioned, the rest of the legislature still

16

required two filings, that in the county recorder's office and

17

that in the court clerk's office.

18
19

It didn't do that.

Believe

Ms. Garcia is correct that Rule 69 does not create
the judgment lien.

However, it does provide procedure to
i

20 j execute against a judgment lien.

And until you docket it, you I

21

have somewhat of a worthless lien.

22

coordination between the statutes that should be read.

23 I

THE COURT:

We believe that that is the

Well, the Court will rule as follows in

24

this matter.

First of all, this Court has some substantial

25

history in the development - not the development necessarily,

1 , but the evolution of the law in regards to liens.

Early on and

2 I until recently the mere fact that a judgment was entered in
3 | either a justice court or a district court in a particular
4 I county would result automatically in a lien being attached to

j

5 I real property which existed in that county. That lien could be I
I
i
6 | - that judgment could be filed in any other county in the state !
7 j and that same effect would occur even in those counties, even

j

!

I

8 j though that is not where the judgment which originally granted, i
9

Our legislature in its wisdom saw fit to depart from

10

that original law a number of years ago by making it a

11

requirement that mere entry of a judgment in a court, even one

12 I of record, did not constitute a lien on real property unless
13

another step was taken.

14

The court would just cite what the Supreme Court has

15

stated as far as the statutory interpretation.

It is stated

16

that in construing the statute you must assume that each term

17

of the statute was used advisedly and that statutory words are

18

read literally unless such reading is unreasonable confusing or

19

inoperable.

Only when you find an ambiguity in the statutes

20 | plain language need we seek guidance from legislative history
21 I and relevant policy considerations.
22 j

Looking at the statute before the Court it is clear

23

to the Court that if you read, first of all you start over in

24

78-22-1 and it talks about the duration of a judgment, it talks j

25 j about a judgment entered in a court, may be filed in any court
j

!

!

6i

!

1 ! of the state, and it shall have the same force and effect as a

•

2

judgment entered in that court.

Then you go over and you look '

i

3 I at 78-22-1.5 and it clearly states in paragraph two that on or ,
4
5

after July 1, 1997 a judgment entered in a district court does
!
I

'

not create a lien upon or affect a title to real property

j
[

6 I unless the judgment is filed in the registry of judgments of
7 j the office of the clerk of the district court of the county in
8 I which the property is located.

So it's got to be filed in the

9 j registry of judgments whether it's in the county in which the
10

judgment is granted or another county.

11

That's the first step.

It goes on to say although that's what you have to

12

have before it can affect a title to real property, after July

13

1, 2002, except as provided in subsection 3B which has to do

14

with governmental agencies, a judgment entered in a district

15

court does not create a lien upon or affect a title to real

16

property unless the judgment or abstract of judgment is

17

recorded in the office of the county recorder in which the real

18

property of the judgment debtor is located.

19

The court would find that those provisions are clear

20

and unambiguous and that the law contemplates a two step

21

process.

22

perfected - in this particular matter the evidence is

In this particular matter - before that lien is

23 | uncontroverted that the plaintiffs in fact recorded a judgment
24 j here in Davis County in the county recorder's office on May
25 I 9th.

Apparently there was some deeds that were exchanged and
7

the first of those deeds transferring the title out of Mr. Kim
occurred on May 19 and apparently was re-recorded on June 13 of
2003, and then subsequent to that time plaintiff filed a copy
of the judgment with the district court here in Davis County in
the registry of judgments.
The Court would find that that lien was not perfected
until both of those steps were taken, that is the filing with
the district court and the filing with the county recorder.
The Court therefore finds that that lien had not attached - did
not attach to the property of, I believe it's Mrs. Kim that was
conveyed to her prior to the June 29 date.

Therefore, the

Court will grant the defendant's motion to quash the execution
in this particular case and as I've indicated before, this
doesn't preclude the filing of a complaint for fraudulent
conveyance because clearly a conveyance occurred when a
judgment was pending or had been granted in another court.
Where you want to go with that, I don't know, but the Court
will quash the execution at this time in this matter.
Anything further?
MR. FERICKS:

Your Honor, would the Court entertain

some additional discussion about that?
THE COURT:
MR. FERICKS:
THE COURT:
MR. FERICKS:

I won't.
All right.
If I'm wrong, you know, you can tell me.
With all due respect, Your Honor, I
8

think we probably will.
THE COURT:
clarification.

j

I think it's a point that needs

J

It doesn't bother me at all.

MR. FERICKS:

You know, our thought is that because a

judgment has an eight year duration, the legislature had to set l
up this sort of segmented process as they moved it over towards I
the county recorder's office which became the single source of !
information after July 1, 2002.
THE COURT:

I don't think it makes any difference

!

because I think the eight year statute runs from the date the
judgment is granted in the district court where it originates, j
MR. FERICKS:
THE COURT:

Right.

So however they want to get it in any

|

other jurisdiction or to perfect that judgment, that's up to
them, but it's still only runs for that eight year period and

j

that clock starts ticking at the time it's entered by the
court.
MR. FERICKS:

Your Honor, just so that we have all of I

our cards on the table, I don't want to play any subtly with

i

the Court, we have as a matter of fact filed an action for

|

fraudulent conveyance and we will be making a prompt motion
with the court for a pre-judgment writ of attachment so that

i

that fraudulent conveyance can actually play itself out before |
what appears to be a fairly volatile title.
THE COURT:

You know, you may want - I don't want to

|
!

1 ' advise you what you should do, but if you've done that,

I

2 I probably a lis pendens needs to be filed on that property also, i
3 J That hasn't been done.
4 I
5

!

MR. FERICKS:
THE COURT:

We understand, Your Honor.

But anyway, that's my ruling as far as

6 | the attachment of the lien and its perfection and I would
7 I really like some direction on it.
8

have not been to the legislature.

9

MR. FERICKS:

10 J

THE COURT:

To me it's clear, but it may

Pardon me?

It may not have been to the legislature,

11

but the way that the statute is worded it's clear to me and

12

I'll be frank with you, we've discussed these things as judges

13

as far as our training because of the significance of departure

14

from what the law used to be as far as judgments and how they

15

attached, and so we've talked about this among ourselves at our

16

trainings and those kinds of things.

17

MR. FERICKS:

Your Honor, just to clarify the

18 I rationale under the Court's ruling, is the Court declining to
19

consider the legislative history as presented by the affidavit

20 I of the sponsoring legislature?
21
22
23

THE COURT:

I am, because I don't think it's

ambiguous.
MR. FERICKS:

Okay.

Is the Court declining to

24 J consider the county attorney's affidavit with regard to
25 ! direction that he's given to the county recorder?
10

THE COURT:

It's irrelevant to me.

I think you're

wrong.
MR. FERICKS:

All right.

Your Honor, could we ask

the clerk if we could get a copy of - I assume the Court's
decision is on the video?
THE COURT:

Yes.

MR. FERICKS:

Okay, we'd like a copy of that.

We'll

have a transcript created.
THE COURT:

What you should do is make that request

to the court and then that goes to the court reporter and they
make those.
MR. FERICKS:
THE COURT:

Thank you, Your Honor.

All right, thanks for appearing.

Ms. Noyce, would you prepare findings and judgment in
accordance with the court's ruling?
MS. NOYCE:

Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

You will circulate to opposing counsel

before it's submitted to me.
MS. NOYCE:

Yes.

THE COURT:

Thank you.

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)
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